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The Atmosphere 
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and global governance
The 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change set a remarkable 
precedent for speed of entry into force of a global treaty. 
With the threshold of 55 parties and 55% of greenhouse gas 
emissions being reached within a year of its adoption, the 
agreement entered into force before the following Conference 
of the Parties (COP22) in Marrakech (November 2016). By 
the end of COP22 there were over a hundred ratifications.1 
This was both a vote of confidence in the agreement and a 
sign of the strong international commitment to tackle climate 
change. Less obvious is the fact that the agreement reflects a 
new model of international governance of climate change, in 
which the role of the central legal instrument has changed. It 
is yet to be tested, but these early signs of confidence augur 
well. 
In the earlier days of climate change 
negotiations, with the impetus coming 
largely from the Western powers, there 
was a widely shared assumption that a 
legally binding instrument was necessary 
to address this global commons problem. 
According to this view, it was axiomatic 
that to be effective, and to deal with 
the ‘free-rider’ problem, a compliance 
mechanism with sanctions was needed. 
Another assumption was that any 
agreement needed to be ‘top-down’, a 
term frequently used in and around the 
negotiations, but somewhat lacking in 
precision. The ultimate expression of 
‘top-down’ perhaps was the referral of 
climate change to the United Nations 
Security Council,2 the highest authority 
among states. It also included the concept 
that legal obligations would cascade 
down to individual states from the global 
level, distributed according to a burden-
sharing principle. 
The first and still the core international 
treaty on climate change, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), only partly 
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satisfied these requirements. It was ‘top-
down’ in that it defined the problem and 
set out some global goals. It included 
a burden-sharing principle, ‘common 
but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities’ (known as CBDR, 
but more correctly CBDR-RC, to give 
full weight to ‘respective capabilities’, 
an aspect that was later to become 
important in the negotiations). While 
the convention contains a general legal 
obligation on all parties to take action 
on climate change, this is not expressed 
in state-specific or quantified obligations, 
unlike the treaties on ozone or acid rain 
which had been seen as models.
The second climate change treaty, 
the Kyoto Protocol, came closer to 
satisfying the early assumptions 
through a quantified collective (but 
not global) goal, quantified, country-
specific commitments and a compliance 
mechanism with sanctions. But these 
applied only to Annex I parties, broadly 
speaking those who were in the OECD in 
1990 and the economies in transition of 
Eastern Europe. It was intended as a first 
step, with industrialised countries taking 
the lead. But it was adopted without 
a clear route towards expanding the 
number of parties with commitments, 
so could not hope to achieve the core 
objective of the convention. Of course 
the failure of the United States to ratify 
meant that the protocol could not fully 
achieve even its more limited objective. 
Shortcomings of the top-down model 
Difficulties with the top-down model were 
apparent when the Kyoto Protocol’s trigger 
point for negotiating further commitments 
was reached in 2005. Extending legally 
binding obligations to all parties proved a 
huge obstacle. The first attempt led to a two-
track negotiation of unequal legal status, 
with one element being the further legally 
binding commitments under the protocol 
for Annex I parties, the other a ‘cooperative 
dialogue on long term cooperative action’ 
under the convention (LCA), with any new 
commitments excluded. The two tracks 
persisted, with the second one gaining 
status as a full negotiation only from 2007.3
Given the formidable obstacle that 
neither the United States nor China, 
the world’s two biggest emitters, could 
accept legally binding obligations, there 
was little prospect that a fully universal 
climate regime could replicate the Kyoto 
model. There were other difficulties 
too. Climate change reaches far more 
deeply and widely into sensitive areas of 
domestic policies than the environmental 
precedents of ozone and acid rain. 
Some states rejected the limitations on 
sovereignty that a binding commitment 
would entail. They were also reluctant 
to make ‘targets and timetables’ 
commitments far into the future because 
of the many uncertainties and risks they 
saw. If, despite these kinds of concerns, 
states are pushed into adopting binding 
commitments, they will be cautious and 
any targets will be conservative. 
Notwithstanding the manifest 
problems with the Kyoto model, many 
parties wanted to pursue it, with the 
European Union and the small island 
states prominent, and the latter prepared 
to break ranks with the G77, which was 
dominated by the larger states. 
Another obstacle was that it was 
proving impossible to agree on burden-
sharing criteria. In a context of a 
long-term agreement, some common 
understanding on burden-sharing is 
critical. There was then, as now, no 
shortage of burden-sharing methods, 
the subject of much work by academics. 
But all are problematic in the real world; 
none would be considered ‘fair’ by 
all countries. For example, basing the 
burden-sharing on per capita emissions, 
as many advocate, would directly oppose 
the two most populous countries, China 
and India; it suits the latter but not the 
former. Any burden-sharing principle is 
subject to challenge by countries listing 
‘national circumstances’, for the most 
part to demonstrate the difficulties they 
would face in meeting an ambitious 
target. New Zealand’s list includes its 
high percentages of renewable electricity 
and of emissions from agriculture. 
What of the convention’s CBDR 
principle? On the face of it this could 
be used to apply fairly to all parties, 
especially when full weight is given to 
‘respective capabilities’. Unfortunately, 
the principle had a legacy in the 
negotiations that was synonymous with 
the dichotomy of Annex I parties with 
binding quantified commitments and all 
other parties without them. There was a 
disincentive on parties to agree to shift 
from the commitment-free zone, hence 
the absurdity of some of the wealthiest 
countries in the world invoking CBDR 
to maintain their status quo. The United 
States stated clearly in the negotiations 
that it had no difficulty with the principle 
per se. But because of how it was being 
interpreted by many parties, retaining 
it unchanged in a new agreement was 
unacceptable. The dichotomy of CBDR 
reflected the 1990 world economy, 
the negotiations were taking place a 
quarter of a century after this, and the 
new agreement would need to look out 
towards mid-century. The biggest change 
factor was the emerging economies, with 
China in particular overtaking the United 
States as the world’s highest emitter, and 
the emerging economies as a whole being 
responsible for most of the growth in 
global emissions. 
Another weakness of the model, in 
the light of the evolution of the world 
economy, was the absence of non-state 
actors. Local government (especially 
Given the formidable obstacle that 
neither the United States nor China ... 
could accept legally binding obligations, 
there was little prospect that a fully 
universal climate regime could replicate 
the Kyoto model.
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major cities) and business, two key sectors 
in the mitigation of greenhouse gases, 
were involved only on the periphery 
of the climate regime, and mostly 
informally. Local government everywhere 
was having to deal with the challenge of 
adaptation, which led to them addressing 
mitigation as well. As for business, aside 
from their own recognition of climate 
change, there was convergent evidence 
through economic analysis that most of 
the investment to achieve the transition 
from fossil fuels to clean energy would 
need to come from the private sector 
(UNFCCC, 2007, 2008). 
These difficulties combined with 
poor handling of the conference to derail 
the Copenhagen COP in 2009. But the 
failure of the formal negotiations was 
accompanied by a politically conceived 
pivot towards a different model through 
the Copenhagen Accord. The accord 
was silent on the Annex I/non-Annex 
I dichotomy, instead referring to 
developed and developing countries. 
It was neither legally binding nor ‘top-
down’. Copenhagen indeed stimulated 
much rethinking about binding versus 
non-binding agreements, helped by 
research which demonstrated that the 
correlation between ‘bindingness’ (an 
awkward neologism that emerged from 
the negotiations) and effectiveness was 
weak (Bodansky and Diringer, 2010). 
Some advocates of a legally-binding 
agreement came to realise that the most 
important objective was to get a universal 
agreement which could deliver emissions 
reductions by all parties. 
It was realised that other factors, such 
as reputation, could also be an incentive 
for action. The Copenhagen Accord 
itself, despite being voluntary and a side-
agreement negotiated among political 
leaders of only a small number of parties, 
attracted more participants with pledges 
in the months following the conference. 
The following COP at Cancun brought 
the gains of the Copenhagen Accord into 
the UNFCCC, and its legacy is seen in the 
current 2020 pledges. But it takes time for 
such evolution in thinking to find its way 
into the formal negotiations, so anyone 
listening in on subsequent meetings 
would not have noticed much new. 
Only with the 2011 Durban mandate 
was the basis for the Paris Agreement 
laid. Finally there was to be an agreement 
‘applicable to all’, with no prima facie 
binary division. To achieve this required 
a continuation of Kyoto’s commitment 
periods until 2020. The last point to be 
resolved was over legal ‘bindingness’. An 
explicit mandate for a legally binding 
agreement was needed by the European 
Union, but was unacceptable to India. 
In the final moments of the COP, the 
EU appealed for an agreement where 
all parties were ‘equally legally bound’. 
The disagreement was resolved by the 
necessarily ambiguous – and legally 
imprecise – wording of ‘agreed outcome 
with legal force’.
To some extent the discussion of 
‘bindingness’ was a proxy for something 
else: how to get other countries to 
take action commensurate with their 
responsibilities. At the same time as 
some parties were pushing for a legally 
binding agreement under the convention 
in the LCA track, alternatives to a Kyoto-
type compliance mechanism were being 
explored. Negotiators came up with 
yet another term, MRV (‘measurable, 
reportable and verifiable’), designed 
to describe something approaching 
a compliance mechanism through 
heightened transparency, and reporting 
and review rules. This had been 
formalised as early as the 2007 Bali 
negotiating mandate and taken somewhat 
further in the Copenhagen Accord.
An advance in thinking aided by some 
further research was the idea that the way 
to reconcile the disagreement over legal 
form was a ‘hybrid’ agreement, with the 
core disciplines split between binding and 
non-binding. There was no appetite for 
an agreement that would need continued 
renegotiation, so it was important to find 
an outcome that would be future-proof 
and able to attract universal or near- 
universal participation. There was much 
exploration following Durban of which 
elements of an agreement might be in 
each category. 
Discussions after Durban produced 
a further refinement on burden-sharing. 
Whereas CBDR was absent from the 
Durban mandate (except as implied by its 
reference to the negotiations being under 
the convention), it subsequently returned 
with some additional words, ‘in the light 
of different national circumstances’. This 
modification of CBDR lessened its de 
facto inflexibility. It allowed individual 
parties more confidence that their own 
circumstances could be recognised. This 
was consistent with the term ‘nationally 
determined’, which was often interpreted 
as a shift to a ‘bottom-up’ model. But 
equally it lessened the scope for countries 
to shelter behind the dichotomy to avoid 
making a fair contribution. 
The period after Copenhagen was 
also notable for the efforts by successive 
COP presidencies to facilitate greater 
involvement by business. Mexico and 
France were the most successful. Local 
government also had a growing presence 
at COPs. These sectors came together at 
high level at the mid-point of COP21 
(2015) to throw their weight behind an 
agreement, two further sides of a global 
leadership triangle whose first side was 
the 150 heads of state and government 
at the beginning of the conference. A 
powerful argument was that both local 
government and business were taking 
action on climate change independently 
of the UNFCCC, but that a new global 
Broadly, [the Paris Agreement’s] legally 
binding provisions are contained in the 
agreement itself, and the non-legally 
binding ones in the accompanying COP 
decisions.
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agreement was essential to enable their 
action to be more effective. 
Thus, over the ten years since the 
start of this phase of climate change 
negotiations, the limitations of the old 
model had been well explored, and 
some new ideas injected, tested and, if 
promising, socialised. Much of this new 
thinking came about through research 
and informal, offline meetings. The 
contribution of this accumulated work to 
the success of the Paris Agreement should 
not be underestimated. 
Paris: towards a new model of climate 
governance
The Paris Agreement is a treaty and in 
anything but name is a second protocol to 
the UNFCCC.4 It can be seen as a ‘hybrid’ 
consistently with the way this concept 
emerged during the negotiations. Broadly, 
its legally binding provisions are contained 
in the agreement itself, and the non-legally 
binding ones in the accompanying COP 
decisions. The fundamental distinction 
centres on the nationally determined 
contributions (NDCs). There is a binding 
obligation to have an NDC in order 
to ratify the Paris Agreement, but the 
content of the NDC, principally any 
target or targets, is not binding. The legal 
obligation under article 4.2 is to intend to 
achieve the NDC, and to pursue domestic 
measures towards achieving it. It is also 
a requirement for successive NDCs to be 
a progression beyond the previous one, 
and to reflect a party’s highest level of 
ambition. Taken together, the non-binding 
and nationally determined aspects go a 
long way to allaying states’ concerns about 
the risks such as a target that could not be 
met, or competitive risk if other countries 
do not take on a commensurate share of 
the burden. This represents the resolution 
of the long-standing differences on legal 
form among parties. Within this broad 
distinction there is a range of different 
levels of obligation in both the agreement 
and the decisions, conveyed by such 
terms as ‘shall’, ‘should’, ‘parties aim to’, 
‘should strive to’, etc.5 A sign of the critical 
importance of the language around 
obligations was that the final issue to be 
resolved at Paris required a late change 
from ‘shall’ to ‘should’ to satisfy the United 
States.
Much better science communication 
helped to clarify what the fundamental 
objectives of the global climate regime 
should be. The aim of limiting global 
temperature increase to well below 2° in 
article 2 is supplemented by references 
in article 4 to peaking and to implied 
carbon neutrality (a balance between 
sources and sinks) before the end of the 
century. These were informed by the 
contribution of science to understanding 
the importance of cumulative long-lived 
gases. Together they give substance and 
precision to the convention’s objective of 
stabilising greenhouse gases at a safe level 
(UNFCCC article 2). 
The agreement overcomes the rigidity 
of CBDR in another way by retaining the 
reference to developed and developing 
countries, and adding an expectation that 
developing countries will move towards 
quantified economy-wide targets as they 
are able to. This nicely complements 
the reference to different national 
circumstances in article 2, and gives the 
flexibility that the Kyoto Protocol lacked. 
The problematic binary distinction based 
on two lists of countries would not be 
consistent with the agreement. Only least 
developed and small island developing 
states retain separate recognition. 
The Paris Agreement’s alternative to a 
compliance mechanism for NDCs is called 
an ‘enhanced transparency framework’. 
It stems from the earlier discussion 
around MRV. It aims to ‘facilitate clarity, 
transparency and understanding’ and to 
‘build mutual trust and confidence and 
to promote effective implementation’. 
The rules still to be negotiated will be 
important to monitor progress, and 
to encourage countries to continue to 
pledge their highest possible ambition. 
They are also expected to demonstrate 
how their contributions are consistent 
with the goals of the agreement. The 
incentive thus becomes a positive one of 
maintaining reputation rather a negative 
one of avoiding penalties. 
Another achievement of Paris is to 
revise and reintegrate other elements 
of the international climate change 
regime that had been built up under 
the UNFCCC. In its core article 2, the 
Paris Agreement gives adaptation and 
finance equal status with mitigation. Its 
provisions on adaptation, technology, 
capacity-building, finance, and loss 
and damage draw together and update 
existing mechanisms and bodies in a 
more coherent framework. It is not quite 
complete. There remains uncertainty and 
controversy about carbon markets, which 
are important to many parties. But there 
is implied if not explicit recognition 
of their legitimacy in article 6. How 
the technology framework established 
under the agreement will function is 
also unclear, but its role in ‘addressing 
the transformational changes envisioned 
in the Paris Agreement’ was usefully 
acknowledged in Marrakech (UNFCCC, 
2016). 
There is also stronger recognition 
of the role of non-state actors. This is 
somewhat limited in the agreement itself, 
which recognises ‘the importance of the 
engagements of all levels of government 
and various actors ... in addressing climate 
change’. But in the final preambular 
paragraph of the accompanying decisions 
this is expanded to agreeing ‘to promote 
regional and international cooperation 
in order to mobilize stronger and more 
Another achievement of Paris is to revise 
and reintegrate other elements of the 
international climate change regime that 
had been built up under the [United 
Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change].
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ambitious climate action by all Parties 
and non-Party stakeholders, including 
civil society, the private sector, financial 
institutions, cities and other sub national 
authorities, local communities and 
indigenous peoples’. The message here 
is that tackling global warning requires 
a cooperative effort across sectors, with 
governments as but one player. This in 
itself is a significant shift from earlier 
legal instruments, and indeed from 
the beginning of the latest phase of 
negotiations in 2005, when there was 
little explicit recognition of this fact. 
So is the ‘hybrid’ Paris Agreement 
top-down or bottom-up? It is both, and 
in fact it renders these terms obsolete. 
The fact that parties determine their own 
contributions does not make the whole 
agreement bottom-up. Arguably the most 
important dimension is the global goals, 
which are all top-down; they provide an 
overall framing with which nationally 
determined contributions must be 
consistent. And they give an authoritative 
high-level message to other actors. 
Prospects
In the Paris Agreement and its associated 
decisions, two approaches coexist: what 
one might call the ‘targets and timetables’ 
and ‘long-term transition’. The five-
yearly NDCs reflect the former. Over the 
long term it is likely that the latter will 
dominate, with the targets and timetables 
still useful to monitor progress. There 
will still be value in regular assessment of 
progress towards the global goals through 
the five-yearly reviews. The global carbon 
budget that the agreement’s goals imply 
will also be a useful frame of reference, 
though it remains unrealistic to expect 
individual shares to be determined from 
this and allocated through the agreement. 
In the context of moving towards global 
carbon neutrality, it is the nature, speed 
and direction of the transitions that will 
matter most. This implies a hard look 
at each economy, sector by sector, and 
could prove a more powerful organising 
principle than five- or ten-yearly 
economy-wide targets and timetables. 
The legal instrument at the centre 
of governance of climate change has 
thus changed in nature. Previously this 
was seen as the arrangement among 
governments needed to effect change. 
From defining and imposing obligations, 
it has moved more towards a framework 
to facilitate, support and encourage action 
among not only governments but also 
non-state actors. The context outside the 
negotiations has seen governments and 
other actors taking autonomous action. 
The Paris Agreement has already had an 
influence that goes far beyond the scope 
of its legal provisions. As an illustration, 
while silent on the maritime and aviation 
sectors, the agreement has supported and 
stimulated progress in their respective 
bodies. These two categories were not 
included in the Kyoto Protocol’s legal 
disciplines, and consensus on how, if at all, 
they might be brought into the post-2020 
UNFCCC arrangements is elusive. But 
the Paris Agreement provided a context 
which these sectors could not ignore. 
Both delivered results between the Paris 
and Marrakech COPs,6 as did the Kigali 
amendment to the Montreal Protocol, on 
HFCs (hydroflourocarbons), described 
by UN Environment Programme as 
‘another global commitment to stop 
climate change.’7 
The emerging governance model for 
climate change is thus an amalgam of 
traditional intergovernmental provisions 
and recognition of the role of entities 
other than governments. It expresses 
a shared responsibility, where the role 
of the intergovernmental agreement 
is to provide the best conditions for 
the other entities to pay their part. The 
Paris Agreement is at the centre, by itself 
not saving a single tonne of CO2, but 
providing impetus and guidance, and 
enabling a network of links to actors and 
actions that will. Some of these links are 
binding and non-binding legal ones with 
governments; the others are informal but 
still capable of stimulating action and 
providing a favourable context for it. A 
perfect illustration of the new model in 
operation is the 2050 pathways platform 
launched at COP22.8 Conversely, the 
momentum amongst the broader network 
of actors recognised and facilitated by the 
agreement can potentially limit the effect 
of any adverse policy shifts by central 
governments. 
Conclusion
Will this model of climate change 
governance prove effective? Before the 
ink was dry on the agreement, expert 
commentators rushed in to spoil the Paris 
party by stating the obvious, that the 
tabled NDCs were collectively far short 
of the ambition needed to stay within 
the 2° target, let alone 1.5°. But this was 
to miss the point of the achievement, 
overstating the role of the agreement 
itself, and underestimating the future 
contributions from non-state actors. 
Assuming the remaining details, such as 
the transparency and accounting rules, 
can be completed and adopted by 2020, 
the agreement’s first major test will be the 
2023 global stocktake. It is very likely that 
a further round of international political 
leadership will be needed to stimulate 
more ambitious mitigation efforts. 
The Paris Agreement is not perfect, but 
it has demonstrably created momentum. 
Before the ink was dry on the 
agreement, expert commentators 
rushed in to spoil the Paris party by 
stating the obvious, that the tabled 
[nationally determined contributions] 
were collectively far short of the ambition 
needed to stay within the 2° target, let 
alone 1.5°.
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It appears capable of evolution without 
major renegotiations because, as the 
early entry into force showed, it got 
the fundamentals right. This makes the 
agreement a vehicle for greater ambition. 
It should also be resilient against 
temporary defections. Providing all its 
essential rules are in place and are seen to 
work, it may become a precedent that the 
international community can use to meet 
future global commons challenges. 
1 In contrast, the Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, 
adopted three years before the Paris Agreement, had by 
the same date received only about half the number of 
acceptances necessary for its entry into force. 
2 The Security Council has addressed climate change on 
several occasions, including two thematic debates in 
2007 and 2011 at the initiative of the UK and Germany 
respectively. Ban Ki-moon, UN secretary general, described 
its attention to climate change as ‘appropriate and essential’. 
But the Security Council has not been able to agree that 
climate change is a threat to peace and security. Many 
countries wanted to avoid any leakage of negotiations from 
the UNFCCC, whose CBDR principle (see below) would not 
apply in the Security Council.
3 For the history of the negotiations from 2005 to the Paris 
Agreement see Macey (2012, 2016).
4 The term ‘protocol’ would have made it more difficult for the 
US administration to classify it as an executive agreement, 
and hence avoid the need for Senate approval. 
5 For a detailed legal analysis of the Paris Agreement see 
Bodansky (2016).
6 After the Paris Agreement, silent, to the dismay of some, on 
maritime emissions, a maritime industry official commented: 
‘the shipping industry remains committed to ambitious CO2 
emission reduction across the entire world merchant fleet, 
reducing CO2 per tonne-km by at least 50% before 2050 
compared to 2007’. See other, similar comments at http://
worldmaritimenews.com/archives/178732/cop21-paris-
remains-silent-on-shipping-and-aviation. The International 
Maritime Organisation’s maritime environment protection 
committee (MEPC), at its October 2016 meeting, agreed on 
further measures, including a CO2 monitoring system. At this 
meeting frequent reference was made to the Paris Agreement, 
and the need to front up to COP22 with a positive story. 
Industry associations called for work to determine shipping’s 
‘“fair share contribution” towards reducing the world’s 
total CO2 emissions’. See https://www.bimco.org/News/
Press-releases/20161019_Shipping_industry_united_in_
seeking_further_progress_on_CO2_at_critical_IMO_meeting. 
It was a similar story for aviation. An air transport body, the 
Air Transport Action Group, would have liked to see aviation 
included in the Paris Agreement, but nonetheless saw it as 
providing ‘positive momentum’ for the sector. ATAG also 
reiterated the goal of carbon neutral growth from 2020. 
See http://aviationbenefits.org/newswire/2015/12/aviation-
co2-emissions-to-be-dealt-with-next-year-at-icao. This 
momentum was real: less than a year later, in October 2016, 
the International Civil Aviation Organization established a 
new global market-based measure (GMBM) to control CO2 
emissions from international aviation. See http://www.icao.
int/Newsroom/Pages/Historic-agreement-reached-to-mitigate-
inernational-aviation-emissions.aspx.
7 http://web.unep.org/kigali-amendment-montreal-protocol-
another-global-commitment-stop-climate-change.
8 The platform will ‘support countries seeking to develop 
long-term, deep decarbonisation strategies ... It will also 
build a broader constellation of cities, states, and companies 
engaged in long-term low-emissions planning of their 
own, and in support of the national strategies’. See http://
newsroom.unfccc.int/media/791675/2050-pathway-
announcement-finalclean-3.pdf.
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